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A generation has passed since the events of December 7, 1941 catapulted an
outraged United States into World War II. As that great struggle unfolded,
we told our boys in uniform—and each other—that the memory of their
sacrifices could never fade, that the imperishable gratitude of a nation would
forever sanctify their deeds, their lives, their deaths. Anxious millions followed
the course of hostilities as we overcame the grim reverses of early 1942 and
trudged along the road to victory.
It was a road carefully—if sometimes belatedly—described by military
historians, mindful of the need to capture at the scene if possible the records of
battles destined, unbelievably, to lose their awful immediacy, their flesh and
blood, to sink into the background of the vague past—in a word, to become
neither more nor less than "history".
And now—so soon, really—that is what we have. We are reminded that
today more than half of our people can share no intimate knowledge of the'
great crusade which ended on September 2, 1945; they were not yet born.
Well, up there on the shelves are the books, fat or thin, that tell how men
fought at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Angaur, Iwo Jima, Okinawa—hallowed names
all, and seared into the soul of many a middle-aged American.
It seemed an eon then, but things actually went so fast. Could anyone hope
to keep up with them? Some tried, almost from the start of war. In the Pacific,
Richard Tregaskis wrote his famous Guadalcanal Diary for the International
News Service. S. L. A. Marshall, first Army historian in the Central Pacific,
produced Island Victory. And at military units here and there, "many and
varied undertakings in historical writing" were in progress. So many, in
fact, that on August 3, 1943, the War Department set up a coordinating
agency—the Historical Branch, G-2, in the Military Intelligence Division.
Thanks for help go to Mr. Robert R. Smith, now with the Office of the Chief of Military
History in Washington, to Col. Frederick P. Todd, USA, Ret.; to Col. H.A. Schmidt,
Chief of the Historical Services Division, OCMH, and to Mr. Hugh M. Lytle of Honolulu.
Quotations and factual material are from Chap. 8, "Historical Section", of the History of
the G-2 Section, HUSAFMIDPAC. More background about the First Information and
Historical Service is in the history of the G-2 Public Relations Section, HUSAFMIDPAC.
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Its ambitious mission: to plan and supervise the compilation of the war's
history, at least from the Army's viewpoint. There would be "operational
monographs, theater and campaign histories, administrative histories, a
general popular history, an official history, and published documents." No
mean task, certainly.
And just as certainly the fire and drama of the war could be captured—if
at all—only in those operational monographs and campaign histories. But
there were of course the pedestrian accounts of administrative doings,
important in their way, and for the purposes of this memoir we must trace the
development of activity concerned with recording the deeds of Fort Shafter
headquarters.
On August 5,1944—a year after the organization of the Historical Branch—
Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, activated the
First Information and Historical Service. This outfit, functioning under G-2
(Intelligence), was charged with planning and scheduling projects. Although
its primary job was to collect, prepare and forward information about combat
operations, it received—in December, 1955—the additional chore of making
up a tentative outline for the theater history.
This was ready by the middle of January, 1945; the suggested 21 chapters
were such that they could be assigned to different men, who would be working
on them simultaneously. Major Hugh M. Lytle, commanding the 1st I & H,
transmitted to headquarters the estimated time necessary: a total of 76
man-months. Another idea expressed at the same time was the need for close
liaison with the Navy, since researchers would demand access to classified
records of both services. During this period the I & H staff were formulating
a tentative chronology of the theater history; they also worked on a general
descriptive survey of records held at Headquarters, USAFPOA. But on
January 20, 1945, the 1st I & H was attached to the Tenth Army and moved
to Schofield Barracks. Work on the theater history practically stopped.
Already, late in 1944, the G-2 of USAFPOA at Fort Shafter "had started
negotiations with the Historical Branch in Washington to have a qualified
military historian assigned to take over direction of the historical element in
the 1st Information and Historical Service, destined for assignment as a unit
to Tenth Army." This action brought Lt. Col. Frederick P. Todd to Hawaii
on February 11, 1945. Todd had been transferred from the Noumea, New
Caledonia headquarters of United States Army Forces in the South Pacific
Area (USAFISPA). At Noumea he had planned and supervised research and
writing of their headquarters history.
Soon after Lt. Col. Todd arrived, a Historical Subsection, G-2, USAFPOA,
was set up. Its assigned tasks included working up the theater history. Helping
Todd in the early weeks was Lt. Col. Jesse S. Douglas, Liaison and Policy
Officer for the War Department Historical Branch. He arrived 9 days after
Todd and stayed on Oahu until April 10,1945. During this period, personnel
and equipment were being assembled; about the only work directly bearing
on the theater history was the continuing examination and description of
HUSAFPOA records.
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All of this information comes from the completed narrative now filed with
the Office of the Chief of Military History. The present writer's advent is
chronicled thus: "An increase of personnel, including three officers trained
in the Historical Branch, G-2 who reported for duty late in April, made
possible more direct and specific research and writing on the history of the
Theater as such." I was one of the "increase", and an enlisted man to boot—
the ultimate in anonymity. Late in 1944 the word had filtered down that
volunteers were being rounded up for something called "combat historian".
My remembrance is that the twin qualifications were: (1) rank of private
first class; (2) a master's degree in history. This meant sacrificing a stripe,
but the loss was easy to arrange.
So, late in February, 1945, Pfc Greer found himself at Fort Sam Houston
in San Antonio, with three others similarly committed. Here the deal changed.
We were to split up into a new kind of outfit—3-man combat photo teams
(captain, lieutenant, and sergeant)—supplied with jeep, trailer, loads of
equipment, and a regimental set of Army regulations. The sergeant, naturally,
was the one who had to make out the morning report, keep those regulations
up to date, wash the jeep, etc. But this bubble burst; somewhere up the line
it was decided: no combat photo teams. There we were, flotsam and jetsam.
Our leader, Capt. Battle, disappeared. We had hoped to see him promoted to
major. Henceforth our orders came from a sleek, rotund young man, one
Capt. Concannon, whom we promptly dubbed Cannonfodder, without any
particular malice.
After a short time in limbo, we four got the word to report to Ft. Lewis,
Washington, for embarkation overseas. It looked as though we might be
combat historians after all. A train took us from San Antonio to Seattle. Our
stay there was brief.
We had made the train trip unescorted; still without anyone directly in
charge of us, we boarded a transport. My service record shows that I left the
mainland one day and arrived in Hawaii the next. Actually it was a 12-day
grind, 6 of them spent on a stormy sea. How stormy? One morning at breakfast
we were choking down some victuals, eating standing up, as always. The table,
about waist-high, had a raised rim around it. Suddenly the bucking ship
rolled with apparent intent to capsize. Everything and everybody landed on
the floor. One unfortunate sat down at table's end; a gallon tin of preserves
slid away, hit the rim, and somersaulted upside down onto the lad's head,
which took on the look of a giant, improbable sundae. The rest of us were
wallowing in a slush of coffee, scrambled eggs, and shattered toast. The mess
attendant, viewing this particular mess, radiated rage and frustration. He
shrieked: "What's the matter with you?*!! guys? Would you act like that in
your own homes?"
There were persistent rumors that the groaning ship had cracked, or
was expected to crack, or something such. But on the morning of that
twelfth day we took salt-water showers, put on khakis, and stood on deck
in a downpour while the p.a. system blared "Blue Hawaii". It was April
!> IO45-
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Later, packed into open trucks, we sloshed along Dillingham Blvd. and out
to an installation called the Thirteenth Replacement Depot. It was on the far
side of Wahiawa, which separated it from Schofield Barracks, as I remember.
The rain persisted. The "Reppel Deppel", as it was known, was not a place
to inspire nostalgia. Whoever had laid out our area arranged it so that runoff
drained into and through the theater. Much time was spent in contriving
networks of ditches to remedy this blunder. Other diversions were pulling
weeds around the training area to make it look as though it was being used
(it wasn't), and loading ships.
When I write, "much time was spent", I mean that we were stuck again—
lost. Afterward we found out that our records and orders had been diverted
to Ft. Ruger. But at the time we sweated it out day by day, with frequent
trips to the company office, trying to get information. Our Reppel Deppel
experience lasted some three weeks, perhaps. I have a vague recollection of
learning about President Roosevelt's death there.
Anyhow, one afternoon I was called to the phone; it was then that I heard
Lt. Col. Todd's voice for the first time. It said, in effect: "We need your group
here at Ft. Shafter. Don't budge. If anybody tries to move you out, tell him to
call me first." The next day we were sitting on the porch of the old enlisted
men's barracks at Shafter, looking out across Palm Circle. We were in the first
building to the right of the gate (it and the other barracks are all offices now).
Directly across the road from the gate was old Tripler General Hospital.
Our Historical Subsection now consisted of our 4-man team, plus perhaps
one or two others at this early stage, Col. Todd, and the three officers mention-
ed before. Our first duty station was in the "Pineapple Pentagon"—now
Richardson Hall. Here Col. Todd gave us some lectures on historiography.
He was an impressive man—noble profile, iron-gray mustache, dignified but
courteous deportment. Both before and after the Shafter interlude he had a
distinguished career as a military historian, retiring at the end of his service
as Director of the Military Museum at West Point.
But our Pineapple Pentagon days were few; almost immediately we moved
into a big ground-floor bull pen at the back of what is now Bldg. T13. My
first real job here was a warm-up study of supply activities supporting the
occupation of Baker Island. Its purpose: to see If I had what it took to make
a historian.
Our pace was slow during these weeks. A personnel shuffle was in the works.
Lt. Col. Douglas had left Shafter in April; on June 2 he returned. Conferences
and actions that followed had these results: (1) Historical Subsection people
were all transferred from the 1st I & H to G-2, HUSAFPOA; (2) a Subsection
allotment of 5 officers and 4 enlisted men was set up; (3) Todd returned to
his permanent organization (he left for Okinawa on June 18) and the late Maj.
(later Lt. Col.) John Stevens, formerly a Philadelphia lawyer, replaced him in
command of the Subsection. Stevens arrived on July 31 to relieve Capt.
(later Major) Nelson Drummond of his temporary command; (4) 6 officers
and 3 enlisted men from the 1st I & H were brought in to work on various
assignments: the Okinawa operation, the Palau operations, the XXIV Corps
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and Saipan accounts, and administrative histories. The Historical Subsection
itself, which hosted these men, had as its mission the history of the Hawaiian
Department, USAFICPA, and USAFPOA.
With everyone thus accounted for, I can catch up on certain miscellany. By
this time I was the only one of our original four enlisted men left at the Shafter
historical works. One had gone to the Army newspaper, one to public relations,
and one—at his own repeated loud insistence—to Okinawa. By the time he
got there the action was over, and he started an equally insistent, but futile,
push to go in the opposite direction.
We enlisted men at the Historical Subsection had been put into the Army's
Detached Enlisted Men's List (DEML). We called it "demilitarized". And
it was an easy enough life. A headquarters company housekeeping platoon
swept the floors and washed the dishes; all we had to do was to report to the
job a la civilian. Wednesday and Saturday afternoons, and all day Sunday,
were ours to enjoy.
And enjoy them we did. Along the front of our bull pen—shared with the
military translation section—ran a low railing. This was the drying rack for
swimshorts and even more intimate wear—until the day when a surprise
inspection resulted in an order to CLEAR THAT RAIL.
Outside our quarters was an underground vault which we proposed to use
for storing classified records. But rats had left proof of their presence. So I
typed out an order for rat traps. Many weeks later a thick batch of paper, with
endorsements from as far away as the West Coast, landed in my basket. No
traps anywhere. Meanwhile we had moved to another location, the present
Bldg. T28, behind T13 and next to the golf course.
Before the transfer, one night found me in our bull pen doing some personal
correspondence when a technical sergeant in the translation outfit wandered
in and sat down at his desk. I thought nothing of it until I heard a noise behind
me. Startled, I looked around. The sergeant had broken open the screen and
was climbing out into the shrubbery. Strange! Next morning we got the word:
He had cracked up completely.
The official history of our history continues:
One [of the 3 officers assigned late in April] worked from 1 May to the end of August on
the section treating Naval and joint command, completing treatment of basic principles
and command relationships, and starting a section on joint command in practice. An
enlisted man [myself] working with this officer did research and writing concerning
various phases of joint logistical planning, including exhaustive documentary survey of
the base logistical plan, its implementation, the formation of the joint staff and subse-
quent administrative developments, establishment of supply policy for advanced bases,
and planning derived from this policy.
The monster report my industry eventually generated ran to some 950
manuscript pages, if I remember correctly.
Here we must take up again the thread of continuing activity. We had been
chuffing along for something more than 3 months when Maj. Stevens entered
the scene. Following his advent, certain changes were made in the Theater
History outline. The new dispensation included: (1) an introduction; (2) the
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original plan for the narrative, substantially unchanged; (3) an entirely new
section on Theater operations; (4) a breakdown of the section on joint command,
and (5) extensive changes in certain subject divisions—logistics, civil affairs,
and bases and forward areas. Meanwhile 3 officers sent from the Historical
Branch in Washington joined the Subsection. And HUSAFPOA general and
staff sections had been directed to draw up full historical accounts.
During most of this time the Theater History had been in various stages of
planning and re-planning. But the day came at last when we all sat around a
table and cut the pie: You will take this chapter; you will take that. In this
deal officers and enlisted men, regardless of rank, fared much the same. As we
know, I drew joint logistical operations of the Army and Navy; I occupied my
cubicle and set to work. The others did the same. Out front were the typists
to whom we fed our products. We plowed along steadily.
It was not a typical outfit. We were all college graduates, cooperating on a
scholarly enterprise. Consequently, there was little "G.I." about the office.
Once in a while we took outings together; sometimes to the beach, where Col.
Stevens liked to hum themes from Brahms symphonies for us to identify,
sometimes to a chop suey house. One of my most persistent memories centers
on an evening at Me P. Y. Chong's, then occupying a run-down, 3-story
Victorian mansion at the Waikiki end of the Ala Moana bridge, makai side.
Rumor said it had once been a bawdy house. Many a kamaaina will recall the
effervescent Chong and his various restaurants during a long career of shifting
fortunes. On this particular night the big dish of chop suey came past; perching
on top was a thoroughly boiled roach. The dish passed by. I said nothing.
I still wonder who got the prize.
On the job things went well enough. It was mostly a matter of laying
documents end to end, with enough transition to glue them together—the
whole giving the effect of one of those early operas in which stylized recitatives
haul the listener along between arias. Where sources failed I tried to manufac-
ture them with letters to those involved, or to their successors. I still remember
an especially frustrating incident: I read a reference to a paper that promised
to cover an important gap, hurried to the files, and found a little note: "In
the desk of Col. so and so." Where was the colonel? Transferred out over a
year earlier.
But the unforgettable Lt. Larry was ever with us. He was an
excellent young man, a journalist miscast in the role of historian, laboring
under the agonizing necessity to come up with footnotes and such. Basically,
his trouble was that he wanted to make his dull administrative tale read like
the assault on some Pacific stronghold. Fortunately, his humor never failed
completely: He continued in his darkest days to hum "O'Brien Was Tryin'
to Learn to Speak Hawaiian in His Own Peculiar Way." Poor fellow, his
Gethsemane dragged on and on; he was still at it when I left Shafter.
Early plans to coordinate our efforts with those of the Navy were not idle
vagaries, though often in the course of my work, reading acrimonious letters
and memos, I wondered if the Army and Navy concentrated their most telling
fire on the enemy or on each other. My counterpart, on the third floor of
Makalapa headquarters, was one Lt. James, a serious-minded and industrious
youth. I always tried to time my visits with him to coincide at some point with
lunch, being firmly convinced of the superior merits of Navy chow. One day
I walked into the ground floor to find a detail of sailors crating up stacks of
records. Back to Washington with them. So I vaulted upstairs to congratulate
James on the completion of his work, "COMPLETION OF MY WORK?!" he
screamed on his way to the phone. The records were uncrated.
The weeks and months flew by. We lived them out in our various ways:
some in single-minded contemplation of home, some in the spangled sunshine
and shadow of brief romances, a few in endless dissipation. Then it was
September 2, 1945, the Great Day. Our history of histories continues dryly:
The strength and duty assignments in the Subsection at close of the war were as follows:
The Chief of Section and Theater Historian [Stevens] was co-writer, with one enlisted
historian, of the account of the Okinawa operation. One officer was completing the
account of the Palau operations; another was generally responsible for the research and
writing for the sections of the Theater History concerned with manpower, morale, and
training. A third was assigned to prepare the introduction and the section on operations.
A fourth is assembling biographical data concerning the chief figures in the History. A
fifth was completing the study of classified messages exchanged with the War Depart-
ment. A sixth was acting as liaison agent with the Staff Section historians. A seventh
was responsible for the administrative work of the Subsection. One enlisted historian
[myself] continued the work on the general problem of logistics; another devoted
approximately half time to research concerning training, half to administrative activities.
These, with the addition of a cartographer, an enlisted man who handled staff research
questions and assisted certain of the historians, two enlisted clerks and four civilian
typists, completed the personnel. One officer of the 1st I & H on detached service with
the Subsection for the purpose of completing the Leyte narrative was under orders
transferring him to Washington.
The war was over, but the history was not. I plodded on steadily until
February, 1946, rolling up the hundreds of pages which the completed
account refers to as the "Greer manuscript".
This was during the hectic homeward rush. Enlisted men held "get us
out of here" rallies on Palm Circle; departing troops choked the tent city at
Fort Kamehameha and boarded everything that flew back through Hawaii
from the forward areas. I was in no particular hurry to go, but the day came
when even joint logistics digested all of its fodder, and for me it was back
to the West Coast in a bucket seat.
By this time I was a T3 (in those days No. 1 was at the top, master or first
sergeant). But I had been "passed over" once: One day Lt. Col. Stevens called
me and a man named Morgan into his office. He had one opening for T3,
and he didn't want to choose between us. Would we agree to flip a coin for
it? We would. Morgan won. But another opening came up soon.
As the HUSAFMIDPAC history entered its final phase, there was an
attempt to distill the experience gained into lessons for the future:
Though the problem of giving [an] adequate historical report of the work of the Army
in this Theater had been more or less generally recognized for some time, actual atten-
tion to [this project] throughout the Headquarters began only as the war ended. In the
case of some activities and agencies, where systematic records and reports had been
maintained, [there] was not too serious a delay. In other cases the preparation of a full
and accurate account [presented] major difficulties. The most obvious implication . . .
is that certainly in peace and probably in war a major headquarters should establish
and maintain a historical program with professionally trained personnel. Such a
program should certainly provide for access to and direction of necessary records of the
organization and work of the headquarters. An example of a procedure invaluable in
the insurance of adequate later historical coverage was the recently instituted 'Actions
and Decisions of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff', prepared daily
in this Headquarters. [Experience indicates] that an adequate and continuing historical
agency must have both responsibility and authority to plan and direct the collection
of essential records in such fashion that they will be workable for the purposes of
historical writing.
My last view of our operation came in August, 1946. I had gone back to
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas for discharge. Then an unexpected job offer brought
me again to Hawaii. On a hot summer day I visited the old office in Bldg.
T28. Many familiar faces had disappeared, but the remaining few carried on,
applying the finishing touches. The "Greer manuscript" was being condensed
via dictaphone by a former colleague. Other terminal activities proceeded.
I can't say when the end came; I never returned to find out.
Twenty-two years passed. One April afternoon in 1968 found me talking
to Mr. Robert R. Smith of the Military History Branch, Operations Division,
G-3 at Fort Shatter. He and his staff occupied what had been our enlisted
men's latrine behind the old barracks on Palm Circle. Smith had written the
account of the Palau Islands campaign; we chatted, recalling old mutual
acquaintances. Afterward I went to the shelves where the HUSAFMIDPAC
history stood—15 volumes of carbon-copy typescript bound in crumbling
manila paper. Beside it was a fragmentary set of staff section histories:
The Army in the Pacific Ocean Areas
History of




During World War II




The introduction sketched broad outlines: On July 1, 1943, the old
Hawaiian Department became United States Army Forces in the Central
Pacific Area under Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., and the Army's
defensive role shifted to one of participation in the great westward sweep
toward the Japanese homeland. At the same time, the complex functions of
military government and relations with Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean
Areas (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), continued, as did the "devitalizing
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friction" that ran through all echelons of joint Army-Navy efforts. A year
later—in July, 1944—Army headquarters at Shafter were re-designated
United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, and the command was en-
larged to include, nearly, the stretches from the Aleutians to New Zealand,
and from offshore United States to the hypothetical boundaries of Japan and
the China coast. But again, on August 1, 1945, another change occurred;
this was the creation of United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, and with
this diminished stature the headquarters ended the war.
The three main elements of the Fort Shafter responsibility were combat
operations, administrative and logistical activities, and the often-difficult
Army-Navy joint relations. These relations, likewise, had three phases: (1)
the pre-war principle of "cooperation", (2) increasing joint effort under unity
of command during the war, and (3) the return to joint command (MacArthur
and Nimitz) in the final stage of hostilities.
The massive account compiled by the Historical Subsection concentrated,
quite naturally, on the administrative aspect: training, logistics, and the
administration of manpower, and these last two topics provided the history's
longest sections.
The subjects covered fall into fairly well-defined parts:
OPERATIONS
Pacific Ocean Area as a Theater of War
The Japanese Attack and First Months of War
The Early Offensive—Marshalls and Marianas
USAFPOA Formed—the Offensive Continues
Final Effort and Victory
THE COMMAND
Development of the Hawaiian Department
Development of Organizations for Command in the Central Pacific Area
Development of Organizations for Command in the Pacific Ocean Areas
Reorganization into AFMIDPAC
BASES
Command Structure, Central Pacific Bases
Ferry Route Bases
Early Stepping Stones to Japan
Base Commands
Bases for Final Offensive
Roll-up of Bases
JOINT ACTION
Development of Joint Action
Joint Action Evolved in Practice
Joint Action in Logistics
Joint Action in Communications
LOGISTICAL DEVELOPMENT
Logistical Development from Outbreak of War to Creation of USAFICPA
Logistical Development from Creation of USAFICPA to Creation of
USAFPOA
Logistical Development from Establishment of USAFPOA to End of War
TRAINING











Situation Prior to Pearl Harbor
Establishment of Military Government
Security Regulations Affecting Private Activities
Security Regulations Affecting Public Activities
Security Regulations Affecting Enemy Aliens and Dual Citizens
Conservation and Control of Materials and Supplies
Conservation and Control of Manpower
Conservation and Utilization of Transportation Facilities
Administration of Justice under Military Government
Problems of Jurisdiction and Gradual Lessening of Military Control
As we thumbed through the history everybody else saw, I am sure, just
another decaying space-filler. But behind the shabby row I glimpsed the
ghosts of 1945-1946—laughing, chaffing, working and living in the heady
days of approaching victory. Some have died; others have suffered irreversible
personal tragedy; a few have won a certain measure of distinction. And even
the clear and shining victory itself has been obscured by the clouds of later
years. Only the history remains the same, up there on its shelf.
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